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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
Torts-Damages-CONSIDERATION OF INFLATION IN CALCULATING
LOST FUTURE EARNINGS
Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.,
524 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1975)
An important element of damages in wrongful death or seri-
ous personal injury actions is loss of future earning capacity.' The
trier of fact, in calculating the amount of wages which the decedent
or injured person would have earned in his working lifetime, faces
a task fraught with speculation. 2 In calculating such damages,
courts have long recognized the investment potential of a sum of
money awarded now for future damages. s Consequently, they have
required the reduction of lump-sum awards for lost future earn-
ings to their present value by an appropriate discount factor.4
Traditionally, however, triers of fact have ignored three additional
factors that affect the true value of a plaintiff's award-income
taxation, 5 attorneys' fees, 6 and inflation.7
Since damage awards are not taxable,8 lump-sum awards for
lost future earnings overcompensate plaintiffs by an amount equal
to the income taxes that would have been paid on those .earnings.
However, payments of attorneys' fees, usually out of the damage
proceeds, decrease the amount of actual awards going to plaintiffs.
I See J. STEIN, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY § 6, at 7 (1972).
2 See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.8, at 1316-18 (1956). The jury
should consider such factors as the plaintiff's health, habits, and skill, as well as labor
market conditions and chances of advancement or lay-off. Id. at 1317.
3 See notes 11-12 and accompanying text infra.
4 See note 11 and accompanying text infra.
5 See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 2, § 25.12; J. STEIN, supra note 1, § 6, at 8.
Harper and James argue that compensatory principles permit the plaintiff to recover only
his actual loss and, therefore, courts should deduct income taxes from lost future earnings
because such damage recoveries are tax-exempt. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). Although this requires
courts to speculate about future tax rates, Harper and James assert that such predictions
are inherent in a system of single lump-sum recoveries. They also note the danger that
tax-conscious juries, ignorant of the exemption, will adjust the award upward to take into
account the imagined tax. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES supra note 2, § 25.12.
6 See 1 S. SPEISER, ATTORNEYS' FEES § 12.3, at 463-64 (1973).
7 See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 2, § 25.11.
8 I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). For a discussion of the policy considerations in this field, see
Yorio, Policy Considerations in the Taxation of Damages, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 701 (1977).
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In addition, failure to consider the effect of inflation on future
wages undercompensates plaintiffsY At least two factors-income
tax exemption and inflation-should be considered by the trier of
fact in determining damage awards.'
I
EFFECT OF INFLATION ON LOST
FUTURE EARNINGS
The present-value rule states that all damage awards for lost
future earnings must be discounted to reflect their investment
potential.'1 For example: Suppose a forty-five year-old man is
permanently and totally disabled in an accident caused by the neg-
ligence of another party. In a suit for damages, the plaintiff in-
cludes a claim for loss of future earnings; the court finds that the
man had an earning potential of $10,000 per year. Prior to the
accident the plaintiff's life expectancy and job would have permit-
ted him to work for twenty more years-until age sixty-five. It
would first appear that the plaintiff's damages for lost future earn-
ings should equal $200,000: $10,000 per year multiplied by twenty
years of remaining worklife. However, the investment potential of
$200,000, if actualized, would cause overcompensation of the
plaintiff because there would still be funds left over at the end of
twenty years, assuming annual withdrawals of $10,000.12 To pre-
' See notes 15-19 and accompanying text infra.
10 This Note does not argue that plaintiffs should recover attorneys' fees as part of
damages because this would constitute a radical departure from past practice. Under the
traditional American approach courts do not consider attorneys' fees. 1 S. SPEISER, supra
note 6, § 12.3, at 463-64. Speiser states: "It has been a consistent rule throughout the
United States that a litigant has no inherent right to have his attorneys' fees paid by his
opponent or opponents. Such an iiem is not recoverable in the ordinary case as damages
..... Id.
For a classic example of the judicial justification for ignoring the effects of taxes, infla-
tion, and attorneys' fees on damage awards, see McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,
282 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960) (tax benefits to plaintiffs are
roughly counterbalanced by payments of attorneys' fees and probable losses from future
inflation).
" Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 (1916). In this case, the Supreme
Court firmly established the present-value rule when future damages are involved. It re-
versed the Kentucky Court of Appeals' affirmance of the trial court's instruction to the
jury to compute the lump sum of lost future earnings based on probable gross income
without any adjustments. Id. at 488, reversing Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kelly's Adm'x, 160
Ky. 296, 303, 169 S.W. 736, 739-40 (1914).
12 For example, if $200,000 were deposited in a savings account paying 5% annual
interest, the first year's interest would be $10,000. This means that the plaintiff would be
overcompensated by $10,000 at the end of just the first year.
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vent unjust enrichment, the award must be reduced to a lesser
amount which, if invested at a given rate of interest, would provide
a future stream of payments equaling $10,000 per year, and would
result in a zero balance at the end of the twenty-year period.
Persistent inflation prompts reevaluation of the automatic
application of the present-value rule. The rule was established in
1916-a time of relative price stability' 3-but, with the exception
of the Depression of the 1930's, the Consumer Price Index, a lead-
ing indicator of inflation, has risen steadily since that time.14 Re-
turning to the forty-five year-old plaintiff, consider the $200,000
lump sum amount of lost future earnings reduced to present value
using a discount rate of four percent.15 Its present value would be
roughly $136,000,16 which, if invested at four percent interest,
would enable the plaintiff to withdraw $10,000 annually for twenty
years. However, with an annual inflation rate of two percent,' 7 the
plaintiff would have a "real yield" of only two percent per year on
his award.' 8 In order to give the plaintiff the equivalent of $10,000
purchasing power each year in present dollars, it would be neces-
sary to award him approximately $163,500, or $27,500 more than
under the traditional present-value calculation.1 9
1" With the exception of an inflationary period coinciding with the Civil War, the level
of prices from 1826 to 1916 (the year of the Kelly decision (see note 11 supra)) was very
steady. Using 1967=100, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) was 34 in 1826 and 32.7 in
1916. Excepting the period 1863-1873, the price level never rose above 34 nor fell below
25. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS
1975, at 313 (Table 122) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS]. Against
this backdrop of price stability, the Supreme Court decided that a damage award should be
reduced to present value. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 (1916). Clearly
the Court did not foresee future inflation when it said: "It is self-evident that a given sum
of money in hand is worth more than the like sum of money payable in the future." Id. at
489. However, as inflation offsets the future earning power of money, the difference in
value between a sum of money now and a like sum in the future will decrease as the
inflation rate approaches the interest rate payable on the sum of money. See Henderson,
The Consideration of Increased Productivity and the Discounting of Future Earnings to Present
Value, 20 S.D. L. REV. 307, 309-10 (1975).
14 Using 1967= 100, the CPI rose from 32.7 in 1916 to 125.3 in 1972. Over half of this
increase has occurred since 1947, when the CPI was 66.9. HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS,
supra note 13, at 313. The CPI was 133.1 in 1973, 147.7 in 1974, and 161.2 in 1975. BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, Jan. 1977, at 93
(Table 22).
Is Courts frequently use a discount rate of 4%. See 1 S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR
WRONGFUL DEATH § 8.4, at 711 & n.33 (2d ed. 1975).
1 6 See id. at 717.
1 For the period 1947-1972 (avoiding the extreme inflationary pressures of 1973-
1975), the average yearly decrease in the purchasing power of the dollar was 2.3%. HAND-
BOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 13, at 313.
IS The "real yield" on a sum of money is simply the discount rate minus the inflation
rate. See note 73 infra.
9 See I S. SPEISER, supra note 15, at 714.
19771
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:803
The common argument against considering future inflation"
in damage awards is that it leads to undue speculation on the part
of the jury.2 ' For example, in Sleeman v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway
Co.,22 the Sixth Circuit refused to permit consideration of infla-
tionary trends in determining damage awards because the validity
of such a consideration was unresolved in extra-judicial forums.23
The counter-argument is that jury determinations are largely con-
jectural and function only in terms of probability and not cer-
20 This Note does not discuss the consideration of past and present inflation by appel-
late courts in deciding whether a jury verdict for damages is excessive. It is well-settled that
such consideration is appropriate when an appellate court compares the size of a contested
verdict to awards for comparable injuries in previous years. See Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 611
(1950).
21See Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
839 (1975); In re U.S. Steel Corp., 436 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 987
(1971); Williams v. United States, 435 F.2d 804 (ist Cir. 1970); Frankel v. United States,
321 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Frankel v. Heym, 466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir.
1972); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 2, § 25.11, at 1325-26:
[C]onfusion surrounds present damages for future loss. Future trends in the
value of money are necessarily unknown and so always render such damages
speculative in a way we cannot escape. If the estimates represent a straight-line
projection of present living costs, they will be frustrated by fluctuations either
way. If prophecy of change is heeded, frustration will follow if no change, or
the opposite change, occurs. . . . For the most part the problem-which is
inevitably present in every case of future loss-is not analyzed and the present
value of money is assumed to be the proper basis.
22 414 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1969).
23 Id. at 308. In Sleeman, a personal injury action under the Federal Employers' Liabil-
ity Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970) (F.E.L.A.), the Sixth Circuit rejected the district court's
reasoning that inflationary trends would offset any present-value reduction. 414 F.2d at
307. The court of appeals found no evidentiary basis in the record for the district judge's
decision and stated:
Nor do we encourage the trial courts of our circuit to explore such speculative
influences on future damages as inflation and deflation.
Of course, the nation's economic history since the 1930's would appear to
make the use of present wages as the standard for loss of future earnings some-
what unfair to plaintiffs. But as to the future, the inflation versus deflation debate
rages inconclusively at the highest policy levels of our government, in national
electoral campaigns, in learned economic journals and is exemplified in the daily
gyrations of the stock markets. The debate seems unlikely to be resolved satisfac-
torily in one personal injury trial. And if testimonial resolution of this factor bear-
ing on the future is attempted, the door is opened to similarly speculative and
debatable offsets tending in other directions.
Id. at 308.
Although Sleeman remains a leading case on this issue and courts continue to find its
reasoning persuasive (see, e.g., Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234, 240-41 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975)), its vitality within the Sixth Circuit is in doubt. See
Bach v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 502 F.2d 1117, 1122 (6th Cir. 1974) (F.E.L.A. case; error
for judge to instruct jury not to consider future inflationary trends); cf. Willmore v. Hertz
Corp., 437 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1971) (Michigan law; judge's instruction to jury to consider
inflation not erroneous).
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tainty.2 4 In United States v. English,2 5 the Ninth Circuit held that a
trier of fact may consider inflation in computing a damage
award.2 6 The court noted that predictions about future incomes
and expenses, especially of infants, are as speculative as inflation
projections but are nonetheless made by courts.27
Courts permitting consideration of the inflation factor have
taken one of three approaches. The most extreme view permits
juries to compensate for inflation without the benefit of expert
testimony. 28 Thus, in Bach v. Penn Central Transportation Co.,29
where there was no expert testimony, the Sixth Circuit found error
in the lower court's charge to the jury not to consider future infla-
tion as an element in computing lost future earnings .3 " The court
emphasized an average juror's common experience with inflation,
the necessity for proper compensation of the plaintiff, and the
availability of a judge's power of remittitur 3' in case of an outra-
geous verdict.32 Nevertheless, given the complexity of such deter-
minations, judges and juries are ill-equipped to predict future in-
flation without the aid of expert testimony.3
24 See, e.g., Plourd v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 266 Ore. 666, 679, 513 P.2d 1140,
1147 (1973) (permissible for expert witness to assume future increases in wage rates).
25 521 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1975) (wrongful death action under Federal Tort Claims Act).
261 Id. at 75. The Ninth Circuit also held that the lower court had erred in failing to
discount to present value the damage award for future earnings. Id. at 72.
27 The Ninth Circuit said:
We would also feel impelled to [take into account future inflation] for policy
considerations .... While predicting future inflationary trends, or extrapolating
from present ones, may be speculative, so are most predictions courts make about
future incomes, expenses (as, for example, in the case of the wrongful death of an
infant). Since it is still more probable that there will in the future be changes in
the purchasing power of the dollar, it is better to try as best we can to predict
them rather than to ignore them altogether.
Id. at 75. The court also noted that the plaintiff must present "sound and substantial
economic evidence" in order for the trier of fact to consider inflation. Id. at 75-76.
2 See, e.g., Riha v. Jasper Blackburn Corp., 516 F.2d 840, 845 (8th Cir. 1975) (dictum
in applying Nebraska law).
29 502 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir. 1974) (F.E.L.A. wrongful death case).
"I1d. at 1122.
31 The term "remittitur" refers to the court's action in diminishing the amount of a
jury verdict in response to the defendant's motion for a new trial on the grounds of an
excessive verdict. If the court finds grounds for granting the motion, "it may grant the
plaintiff an election to remit a stated portion of the amount or submit to a new trial." 6A J.
MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 59.05 [3], at.59-47 to 59-48 (2d ed. 1974) (emphasis
omitted) (footnotes omitted).
32 502 F.2d at 1122.
33 One commentator has suggested that using a special verdict could prevent jury con-
fusion about inflation because it would leave the task of computing damages to the judge.
The judge's award would be based on the jury's special findings concerning inflation and
interest rates. Comment, Damages for Loss of Future Income: Accoupting for Inflation, 6 U.S.F..
L. REv. 311, 321-22 (1972). However, expert testimony must be the basis of a special ver-
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Courts at the other extreme presume that the rate of inflation
offsets the discount factor, thereby enabling the trier of fact to
compute the loss of future earnings without any adjustments. The
Alaska Supreme Court adopted such a rule in Beaulieu v. Elliott,34
reasoning that otherwise a plaintiff would be forced to make other
than "safe investments" in order to offset inflation.35
The third approach uses expert testimony to assist in establish-
ing proper discount and inflation rates. 3' The experts-usually
economists3 7-lay the foundation for their predictions by analyzing
past economic trends. Because both the plaintiff and the defendant
usually introduce expert testimony, it is up to the trier of fact to
decide whom to believe. The jury is free to disregard all expert
testimony, but, given the difficult nature of determining damages,
a jury would probably consider some of the expert's testimony.
A recent Second Circuit case, following the third approach,
dict or its utility is largely lost. Absent expert testimony, the judge would be forced to use
only his economic knowledge in charging the jury on the choice of a proper inflation rate.
34 434 P.2d 665, 671 (Alaska 1967).
3' In Beaulieu, the court stated:
Since the plaintiff, through the defendant's fault and not his own, has been placed
in the position of having no assurance [because of inflation] that his award of
future earnings, reduced to present value, can be utilized so that he will ultimately
realize his full earnings, we believe that justice will best be served by permitting
the trier of fact to compute loss of future earnings without reduction to present
value.
Id.
See Note, Future Inflation and Damages, 35 LA. L. REv. 883 (1975); cf. Schnebly v.
Baker, 217 N.W.2d 708 (Iowa 1974). In Schnebly, a malpractice action where damages were
mainly for future institutionalization of a retarded child, the discount factor was offset by
inflation only after the trial court was satisfied that the two rates were roughly the same;
the court permitted the introduction of expert testimony. Id. at 727-28.
36 See United States v. English, 521 F.2d 63, 74-75 (9th Cir. 1975); Schnebly v. Baker,
217 N.W.2d 708, 727-28 (Iowa 1974); Resner v. Northern Pac. Ry., 161 Mont. 177, 181-87,
505 P.2d 86, 88-91 (1973); Tenore v. Nu Car Carriers, Inc., 67 N.J. 466, 475-83, 341 A.2d
613, 618-22 (1975); Plourd v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 266 Ore. 666, 672-81, 513 P.2d
1140, 1144-48 (1973). In Tenore, the New Jersey Supreme Court ordered the trial court to
allow expert testimony on projected inflation rates and discount factors, but prohibited
introduction by the plaintiff of tables that provided exact figures of projected hypothetical
earnings of the decedent adjusted for inflation. 67 N.J. at 481-82, 341 A.2d at 621-22. The
court found such evidence improper for two reasons. First, the tables assumed that the
decedent would not have suffered work interruptions for illness or due to lay-offs-a fact
not within the expertise of plaintiff's expert witness, an economist. Second, the tables
might have had an undue psychological impact on the jury resulting in uncritical accept-
ance. Id. at 482-83, 341 A.2d at 622. Cf. Bach v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 502 F.2d 1117,
1122 (6th Cir. 1974) (expert testimony on exact income that decedent would have received
inadmissible because too speculative).
3 1But cf. Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 143-44 (3d Cir. 1973) (expert
testimony by economist acting in an actuarial capacity did not provide substantial basis for
inflation projection).
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approved a novel solution to the problem of adjusting damage
awards for inflation. Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc. 3 8 held per-
missible an "inflation-adjusted" discount rate, which used an infla-
tion factor to offset the anticipated rate of earnings from invest-
ment of the award.3 9
II
CALCULATION OF AN "INFLATION-ADJUSTED"
DISCOUNT RATE
On June 7, 1971, an Allegheny Airlines flight crashed in fog,
killing Nancy Feldman, a passenger. 4" Her husband brought a
wrongful death action in which Allegheny conceded liability. The
parties submitted the issue of damages to the trial judge.4'
District Judge Blumenfeld awarded damages of $444,056,
largely consisting of compensation for loss of future earning ca-
pacity.42 The lower court first computed a lump sum represent-
ing lost future earnings, without considering inflation.43 Then,
38 524 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1975), modify'ing 382 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Conn. 1974).
'9 See text accompanying notes 48-55 infra. The Second Circuit in Feldman reversed the
district court on two other points. First, the decedent's husband was entitled to recover
"loss of earnings" for his wife's prospective child-bearing years only to the extent that she
would have actually worked during those years. 524 F.2d at 388-89. The district court had
valued the 'loss for this period at the salary level she would have reached in the year
preceding the first child-bearing year. Second, the district court had underestimated the
prospective living expenses that it was required to deduct under Connecticut law from the
amount of future earnings. Id. at 389-90.
40 Nancy Feldman was twenty-five years old at the time of her death and was looking
for employment in Washington, D.C., where she and her husband intended to settle after
he graduated from law school. Id. at 386.
41 Id.
42 Id. The lower court also awarded $100,000 for destruction of the decedent's capacity
to enjoy life's nonremunerative activities. 382 F. Supp. at 1299. This portion of the award
was not altered on appeal. 524 F.2d at 390.
43 382 F. Supp. at 1287. Although the decedent did not have a job in the Washington,
D.C. area at the time of her death, the district court utilized the federal government's
"General Schedule" (GS) of civil service salaries in determining lost future earnings. The
decedent's most recent job in Connecticut involved work similar to that done by the Na-
tional League of Cities and United States Conference of Mayors (NLCIUSCM) in Washing-
ton, D.C. The court used testimony from the personnel manager of NLC/USCM concern-
ing the decedent's qualifications for a GS-12 position in their legislative research program
as a basis for calculating lost future earnings. Id. at 1279. It assumed that the decedent
would have progressed steadily up the GS scale, allowing an eight-year hiatus for raising
children. Id. at 1286. According to the GS pay scale, the decedent would have been earn-
ing $33,757 in the year 2011. Id. at 1287. The projection, therefore, included yearly merit
pay increases, although the lost future earnings were first computed without adjust-
ment for inflation. Had the court merely projected decedent's past earnings ($10,000
in her last year), as is usually done in the absence of the type of evidence offered by the
plaintiff, the total recovery would have been much less. The availability of a schedule of
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in accordance with Connecticut law,44 the judge subtracted a
hypothetical income tax liability of twenty-five percent of gross
income per year. 45 In determining the discount factor, the court
first considered past yields on investments that would be risk-free
were it not for inflation. 46 From this discount factor, Judge
Blumenfeld subtracted the average inflation rate over the same
period.4 7 The resulting "inflation-adjusted" discount rate was used
to calculate the present value of the lost future earnings. Allegheny
objected to the use of this discount rate in arriving at the present
value and appealed.
The Second Circuit approved of the district court's computa-
tion of the discount rate.48 Speaking through Judge Lasker,49 the
court acknowledged that the role of inflation in future damage
calculations was an open question under Connecticut law.50 Since
Connecticut requires the deduction of income taxes otherwise pay-
able on gross earnings,51 the court of appeals reasoned that the
salary increases for use in computing future earnings is unusual. See, e.g., Wilkinson v.
Yamashita-Shinnihon Kisen, K.K., 366 F. Supp. 110, 116 (D. Md. 1973).
" See Floyd v. Fruit Indus., Inc., 144 Conn. 659, 672-73, 136 A.2d 918, 925-26 (1957)
(income taxes must be deducted from probable lifetime earnings).
45 382 F. Supp. at 1287-88. The defendant's expert derived a tax rate of 16.7% on a
gross income of $16,000 per year. The plaintiff's expert, surprisingly, used figures of
23.4% for a gross income of $16,000 and 30% for $27,000. Id. at 1287. Judge Friendly, in
his concurring opinion, criticized the use of a flat income tax rate. 524 F.2d at 392. See
text accompanying note 59 infra.
46 382 F. Supp. at 1293. The district court, relying on the plaintiff's expert, considered
the average returns since 1956 on several types of essentially "risk-free" investments:
3.75% for time deposits in Federal Reserve System member banks, 4.14% for deposits in
all mutual savings banks, and 4.24% for deposits in some specific mutual savings banks. Id.
The court found that the average yield of 4.64% earned by insurance companies from
their investments was a reasonable return for a more sophisticated investor willing to take
some risks. Id. The court accepted the 4.14% average earnings in mutual savings banks as
representative of the return a prudent, nonsophisticated investor could expect. Id.
4
'1d. The district court took the average yearly yield of 4.14% from deposits in mutual
savings banks and then subtracted the average yearly increase over the past 18 years in
the Department of Labor's Consumer Price Index-2.87%. The 1.27% differential was
rounded up to 1.5% and termed the "inflation-adjusted" discount rate. Id. The trial judge
corroborated this "inflation-adjusted" discount rate by calculating real yields since 1940 on
Treasury bills, 10-15 year federal bonds, and 3-5 year federal notes. Id. at 1293, 1309-12.
He found the real yield on such securities to be 2% per year. Id. at 1293. The 1.5%
discount rate was chosen over the 2% rate for two reasons. First, this allowed a margin of
error in case unexpected increases in the rate of inflation depressed long term yields.
Second, the government securities used in calculating the 2% real yield are consid-
ered the domain of the sophisticated investor, not of the damage plaintiff. Id. at 1294.
48 524 F.2d at 387-88.
49Judge Lasker, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, was sitting by designation. Id. at 386 n.*.
50 Id. at 387.
51 See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
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lower court had "appropriately hypothesized the Connecticut Su-
preme Court's favorable reaction to a discount rate adjustment. 5 2
After noting the speculative nature of both lost future earnings
and discount rates, the majority cited increasing support from
courts and commentators for considering the inflation factor in
damage awards. 53 It concluded that, given the latitude afforded by
Connecticut decisions and the historical and economic evidence
before the trial court, the use of an "inflation-adjusted" discount
rate was proper under Connecticut law. 54 The Second Circuit ex-
pressly reserved the question of whether such an inflation adjust-
ment would apply to cases arising under federal law.55
In a concurring opinion, Judge Friendly expressed "the
gravest doubts" concerning the propriety of adjusting the discount
rate for inflation. 56 He joined the majority only because the deci-
sion would not have any precedential value in similar cases under
federal law since it was a diversity case applying Connecticut law. 57
Judge Friendly noted that there was little difference in result be-
tween the method of adjusting the discount rate approved by the
majority and the alternative approach of estimating future earn-
52 524 F.2d at 387.
53 Id. at 387-88.
54 1d. at 388. See Quednau v. Langrish, 144 Conn. 706, 714, 137 A.2d 544, 549 (1957)
(whether jury could consider inflation left open); Floyd v. Fruit Indus., Inc., 144 Conn.
659, 672-73, 136 A.2d 918, 925-26 (1957) (income taxes must be deducted from probable
lifetime earnings); Chase v. Fitzgerald, 132 Conn. 461, 470, 45 A.2d 789, 793 (1946) (lost
future earnings must be discounted to present value).
55 524 F.2d at 387. In McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960), the Second Circuit upheld the trial court's refusal to give
an instruction concerning the nontaxability of damage awards and mentioned the offset-
ting effect of inflation. The court noted its lack of authority for charging the jury to
consider inflation, yet stated that inflation was here to stay. 282 F.2d at 38. Judge Friendly,
who wrote a concurring opinion in Feldman (524 F.2d at 390-93) wrote for the majority in
McWeeney. In Yodice v. Koninklijke Nederlandsche Stoomboot Maatschappij, 443 F.2d 76
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 933 (1973), the Second Circuit again upheld the refusal
of the trial judge to charge the jury with respect to inflation. However, the court stated
that if inflation were to continue at its then present pace, courts might have to reconsider
their traditional charge with regard to the discount rate. The court considered Yodice an
altogether improper vehicle for such a charge, given the absence of economic data in the
record and the small amount of lost future earnings involved. 443 F.2d at 79.
The Supreme Court in Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R., 393 U.S. 156 (1968), upheld
the trial judge's view that a jury award for lost future earnings based in part on the proba-
bility of future wage increases had support in the evidence. Id. at 160. The plaintiff had
offered unrefuted testimony of steady wage increases for equivalent work positions in the
recent past and the strong likelihood of similar increases in the future. Grunenthal v. Long
Island R.R., 292 F. Supp. 813, 815-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Although a strict projection of
plaintiff's past earnings discounted to present value would have equalled about $100,000,
the district court accepted the jury's calculation of $150,000 in lost future earnings. Id.
:6 524 F.2d at 393.57 1d.
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ings with adjustments for inflation and then discounting to present
value in the ordinary manner.
58
Judge Friendly criticized the selection of a flat twenty-five per-
cent tax rate, calling it inconsistent with the court's assumption of
inflated future wages and a progressive tax structure.59 He also
questioned the court's assumption that employers will be able to
respond to continued inflation with equivalent wage increases.
60
There was no dissent.
III
SHOULD INFLATION BE CONSIDERED?
The principal economic argument against adjusting for infla-
tion is that plaintiffs will be compensated for decreases in the pur-
chasing power of the dollar by corresponding increases in the re-
turn on their invested awards. 61 Plaintiffs presumably can protect
themselves from inflation in either of two ways: (1) they can invest
exclusively in short term securities which would yield a rate of
return corresponding to changes in price levels;62 or (2) they can
make long term investments which carry higher rates of return,
thus protecting themselves if the inflation rate remains constant.
6 3
58 1d. at 391. Judge Friendly calculated the award using the alternative approach to
illustrate his point. While maintaining the 1.5% differential ultimately used by the district
court to discount the lump sum, he calculated the present value of the lost future earnings
using a 4.5% annual inflation rate and a 6% yearly rate of return. The difference in
present value between the two approaches was less than $2,000 out of approximately a
quarter of a million dollars. Id. Friendly emphasized that using the "inflation-adjusted"
discount method disguised the future salaries implicitly projected by the district court. As-
suming a steady progression up the GS scale and a 4.5% annual rate of inflation, the
decedent would have been earning $122,823 in the year 2011. Id. at 392.59 1d.
60 Id
.
61 This phenomenon is described in P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS (9th ed. 1973):
Once an inflation has gone on for a long time and is no longer "unforeseen," an
allowance for a price rise will gradually get itself built into the market interest
rate. Thus, once we all expect prices to rise at 4 per cent per year, my pension
funds invested in bonds and mortgages will tend to pay me 8 per cent rather than
4 per cent. This adjustment of interest rates to chronic inflation has been ob-
served in Brazil, Chile, and indeed in almost all other countries with a long history
of rising prices.
Id. at 272.
62 For instance, if the yield on a certain short term investment is 4% and the inflation
rate is 2%, the investor is receiving a 2% real yield on his investment. If the inflation rate
were to climb to 4% the next year, the yield on this investment, if responsive, should
increase to 6%. See Comment, Inflation and Future Loss of Earnings, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 281,
286 (1975).
63 For example, assuming that in a period of 3% inflation the plaintiff must earn 5%
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There are specific problems with both solutions. Investment in
short term securities would require frequent market trading and,
therefore, sizeable transaction costs that would cut into the net
return on the invested award. Investment in high-yield, long term
securities such as high-grade municipal and corporate bonds as a
hedge against inflation ignores the plaintiff's needs to make
periodic withdrawals from the fund. 64 As a replacement for lost
future wages, the award fund should be as accessible to the plain-
tiff as those wages would have been.
In addition, both solutions require a degree of investment
skill that is inconsistent with compensatory principles.65 Courts
usually assume that plaintiffs will exercise the skill of a prudent,
nonsophisticated investor.66 In Feldman, for example, the court
suggested that deposits in mutual saving banks were "risk-free"
investments that plaintiffs, as prudent nonsophisticated investors,
could make.67
Because yields on bank deposits are controlled by the Federal
on his award, an 8% corporate bond will provide such a return as long as the rate of
inflation does not exceed 3%.
64 See Peck & Hopkins, Economics and Impaired Earning Capacity in Personal Injury Cases,
44 WASH. L. Rv. 351, 376 (1969).
6'See, e.g., Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 (1916). In establishing that
damage awards for- future losses should be reduced to present value (see notes 11 & 13 and
accompanying text supra), the Supreme Court set a guideline for the type of investment
return expected of plaintiffs:
We do not mean to say that the discount should be at what is commonly
called the "legal rate" of interest; that is, the rate limited by law, beyond which
interest is prohibited. It may be that such rates are not obtainable upon invest-
ments on safe securities, at least without the exercise of financial experience and
skill in the administration of the fund .... This, however, is a matter that ordi-
narily may be adjusted by scaling the rate of interest to be adopted in computing
the present value of the future benefits; it being a matter of common knowledge
that, as a rule, the best and safest investments, and those which require the least
care, yield only a moderate return.
Id. at 490-9 1.
"
6 See notes 34-35 and accompanying text supra. But see Frankel v. United States, 321
F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'dsub nom. Frankel v. Heym, 466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972).
Frankel was a personal injury action involving a permanently disabled plaintiff who argued
that inflation should be considered in computing the future cost of institutionalization.
The district court suggested that the plaintiff could invest in an appreciating asset (such
as land) that would keep pace with inflation and offset any possible erosion of the original
award. 321 F. Supp. at 1346. This reasoning is not only inconsistent with the investment-
skill guidelines laid down in Kelly (see note 65 supra) but fails to consider the necessity of
regular withdrawals of both principal and interest from the award fund. This problem
has been noted by commentators, none of whom advocate that plaintiffs be expected to
"hedge" against inflation. See Peck & Hopkins, supra note 64, at 375-76; Comment, supra
note 62, at 287; Note, Future Inflation and the Undercompensated Plaintiff, 4 Loy. CHi. L.J.
359, 361 (1973).
67 524 F.2d at 387. See note 46 supra.
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Reserve Board and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 8
and do not automatically adjust themselves in response to inflation,
the Second Circuit, in suggesting such an investment, implicitly
rejected the contention that plaintiff's investments should provide
their own buffer against future cost-of-living increases. The Feld-
man court also properly recognized the liquidity needs of the plain-
tiff by basing the discount rate on savings bank deposits.
The practical argument against adjustment for inflation is that
its future course is unpredictable and subject to speculation. The
Feldman approach forcefully meets this argument. Feldman ap-
proved the use of a historical differential between interest and in-
flation rates as the appropriate method for reducing lost future
earnings to present value.6 9 This approach avoids individual pre-
dictions of either inflation or interest rates and, instead, recognizes
a historical average differential between the two; it is no more
speculative than the traditional discount rate calculation, and, in
addition, the use of a historical period, incorporating both expan-
sionary and recessionary periods of economic activity, provides a
sound basis for prediction.
The method of accounting for inflation used by most courts is
to adjust salaries upward for inflation and then, in a separate com-
putation, reduce the total of future wages to present value."' The
Feldman method simplifies the more conventional calculation by
eliminating the need to inflate future earnings and leaves only the
task of reducing the award to present value This simplifies jury
computations.7' It also shields the jury from confronting the often
shocking amount of inflated future earnings before their reduction
to present value.72
Since inflation and interest rates are theoretically related,
sound economic analysis supports the calculation of an average
difference between the two as the proper basis for prediction.73
"8 See 12 C.F.R. § 217.7 (1976) (Federal Reserve System controls its member banks); id.
§§ 329.6, .7 (Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. regulates nonmember banks).
!9 See note 47 supra.
7 0 E.g., United States v. English, 521 F.2d 63, 75 (9th Cir. 1975).
71 See Seaboard Coastline R.R. v. Garrison, 336 So. 2d 423, 425 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976) (Feldman approach beneficial because fewer calculations involved). Some courts and
commentators question jury competence to accurately make such calculations. See, e.g.,
McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960); Note, Fluctuating Dollars and Tort Damage Verdicts, 48 COLUM. L.
REv. 264, 271 (1948). For an expression of confidence in a jury's ability to handle difficult
calculations, see Burlington N., Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 293 (9th Cir. 1975) (calcu-
lation of future tax liability).
72 See 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 138, 144-45 (1976) (discussion of Feldman case).
7' Consider the following simple illustration of the relationship between prices, interest
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Although the Feldman court's use of this method may have dis-
guised the level of annual earnings that the court implicitly pro-
jected,7 4 the majority merely attempted to arrive at an appropri-
ate discount factor to avoid undercompensating the plaintiff.
The court did not predict the actual future rates of interest or
inflation; it merely recognized a historical average differential
between the two and projected this into the future.
An alternative method was used by the Alaska Supreme Court
in Beaulieu v. Elliott.7 5 Recognizing the effect of future inflation on
the earning potential of damage awards, the Beaulieu court decided
that the two opposing factors should be presumed equal, thus ob-
viating the necessity of reducing to present value.7 6 This approach
certainly has the advantage of simplicity-neither expert testi-
mony nor complicated damage computations are required-but it
ignores the "real interest rate," the historical differential between
rates of interest and inflation.7 7 The Beaulieu position also ignores
the hypothetical income tax liability to which any future earnings
would have been subject; Feldman considered this factor because
Connecticut is one of a few jurisdictions that requires a reduction
for income tax liability. 8 The Beaulieu approach tends to over-
compensate the plaintiff and therefore, despite its simplicity, is in-
ferior to the Feldman discount rate adjustment method.79
Although those courts that have considered inflation 8" have
rates, and real interest rates:
Americans who bought government saving bonds almost a decade ago, with a
nominal yield of 4/4 per cent, can actually buy less today with $100 than with the
$75 the bonds cost-entailing a "real interest return" of less than zero per cent.
These examples stress the need to define the "real interest rate" as the
"money interest rate" minus "the percentage price rise." Thus, if the money rate is
8 per cent for Americans and the annual price rise is 5 per cent, then the true
real rate of interest is 8-5 = 3 per cent. So to speak, 100 market baskets of goods
lent today gives you next year only 103 (not 108!) market baskets in return.
P. SAMUELSON, supra note 61, at 607.
" See note 58 supra.
75 434 P.2d 665 (Alaska 1967). See notes 34-35 and accompanying text supra.
76 434 P.2d at 671-72.
77 See note 73 supra.
71 524 F.2d at 387. The District of Columbia, Florida, Iowa, New Jersey, and Okla-
homa also require that income taxes be deducted from -damage awards for otherwise taxa-
ble income. See Runyon v. District of Columbia, 463 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1972); O'Connor
v. United States, 269 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1959) (Okla. law); Adams v. Deur, 173 N.W.2d 100
(Iowa 1969); Tenore v. Nu Car Carriers, Inc., 67 N.J. 466, 341 A.2d 613 (1975); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.18(5) (West Supp. 1976).
7 Contra Freeport Sulphur Co. v. S/S Hermosa, 526 F.2d 300, 308-11 (5th Cir. 1976)
(concurring opinion, Wisdom, J.) (admiralty case involving capital expenditure for damages
to dock).
'0 See United States v. English, 521 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1975) (error not to discount to
1977]
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gone a step beyond courts that steadfastly adhere to the present-
value rule,8 ' they have not reached the best solution. Plaintiffs will
be properly compensated for lost future wages only when courts
follow the Feldman approach and consider interest, inflation, and
tax factors.82
CONCLUSION
Inflation upsets the rationale for a strict application of the
present-value rule and prompts the introduction of expert tes-
timony to assist the jury in establishing proper inflation and dis-
count rates. The calculation of an inflation rate is no more specu-
lative than the choice of a discount rate; both are examples of
predictions that juries must make under a single lump-sum recov-
ery for damages.
The Second Circuit in Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.
approved the use of an inflation-adjusted discount rate computed
by calculating a historical differential between rates of interest on
risk-free investments and rates of inflation as reflected in the Con-
sumer Price Index. By focusing on the return from risk-free in-
vestments, the court implicitly rejected the argument that the
plaintiff make other than risk-free investments to compensate for
inflation.
Having also taken into account a hypothetical income tax on
the future earnings, the Second Circuit's decision represents the
most comprehensive solution to date dealing with compensation
for lost future earnings. The use of an inflation-adjusted discount
rate combines two theoretically related factors over a recent histor-
ical period. It also simplifies the often-used two-step procedure of
first adjusting for inflation and then discounting to present value.
John R. McQueen
present value or take inflation into account-no mention of income tax liability); Bach v.
Penn Cen. Transp. Co., 502 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir. 1974) (consideration of inflation held
proper-no mention of income tax exclusion); State v. Daley, 153 Ind. App. 330, 287
N.E.2d 552 (1972) (proper to include 5% yearly wage increase-no mention of income tax
liability); Resner v. Northern Pac. Ry., 161 Mont. 177, 505 P.2d 86 (1973) (no mention of
income tax exclusion). But see Deweese v. United States, 419 F. Supp. 170 (D. Colo. 1976)
(consideration of inflation improper-deduction of taxes required).
" See, e.g., Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 839 (1975) (error to consider inflation but calculated future earnings must be re-
duced to present value).
82 Accord, Tenore v. Nu Car Carriers, Inc., 67 N.J. 466, 341 A.2d 613 (1975) (error for
lower court to exclude evidence of inflation and income tax exclusion). For a discussion
of this case, see note 36 supra.
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